

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Franklin S. Jones,)	C/A No. 4:15-cv-4193-BHH-TER
)	
Petitioner,)	
)	REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
v.)	
)	
T. Bragg, Warden)	
)	
Respondent.)	
)	

The petitioner, Franklin S. Jones, a self-represented prisoner confined at Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI”) Bennettsville, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) (D.S.C.) Having reviewed the Petition in accordance with applicable law, the court concludes that it should be summarily dismissed.

I. Factual and Procedural Background¹

On October 13, 2005, petitioner was charged in an indictment alleging two counts of distribution of cocaine base and one count of distribution of cocaine base and cocaine, all in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). On May 15, 2006, petitioner pleaded guilty to all counts without a written plea agreement. On January 29, 2007, the District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina sentenced petitioner to 188 months as to counts one, two, and three, to run concurrently. On February

¹The Court may take judicial notice of the filings in Petitioner’s underlying criminal case (Cr. Case No. 2:05-cr-29) out of the Eastern District of North Carolina. See generally, Aloe Creme Laboratories, Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970); See also Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F. 2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (federal courts may take judicial notice of proceedings in other courts if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue). The procedural history set forth herein is derived from the docket entries in Petitioner’s underlying criminal case.

12, 2007, petitioner filed a notice of appeal, and on January 8, 2008, the Fourth Circuit denied the appeal and affirmed petitioner's sentence. On April 9, 2012, petitioner filed a motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, in which he claimed to be entitled to a sentence reduction because, applying United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011), the predicate offenses on which the career offender enhancement was based are no longer qualifying offenses. Petitioner's 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition was dismissed by Order filed December 31, 2012. The appeal of the same was dismissed in April 2013. Citing primarily United States v. Simmons, 649 F. 3d 237 (2011), Petitioner contends in the instant petition that he was incorrectly classified as a "career offender" under United States Sentencing Guideline § 4B1.1 (USSG). (ECF No. 1.) Therefore, in his request for relief, Petitioner indicates that he should be resentenced "without the career offender designation." (ECF No. 1.).

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the *pro se* Petition filed in this case pursuant to the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases,² 28 U.S.C. § 2254; the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214; and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983).

² The Rules Governing Section 2254 are applicable to habeas actions brought under § 2241. See Rule 1(b).

This court is required to liberally construe *pro se* petitions. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007). *Pro se* petitions are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, id.; Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), and a federal district court is charged with liberally construing a petition filed by a *pro se* litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). When a federal court is evaluating a *pro se* petition the petitioner's allegations are assumed to be true. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)).

However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990). The mandated liberal construction afforded to *pro se* pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the petitioner could prevail, it should do so; however, a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 1999), construct the petitioner's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

B. Analysis

"[I]t is well established that defendants convicted in federal court are obliged to seek habeas relief from their convictions and sentences through § 2255." Rice v. Rivera, 617 F.3d 802, 807 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194 (4th Cir. 1997)); see also United States v. Surratt, 797 F.3d 240, 246 (4th Cir. 2015) ("Section 2255 provides the ordinary means for a federal prisoner to challenge his conviction or sentence."). In contrast, a motion filed under § 2241 is typically used

to challenge the manner in which a sentence is executed. See In re Vial, 115 F.3d at 1194 n.5. A petitioner cannot challenge his federal conviction and sentence under § 2241 unless he can satisfy the § 2255 savings clause, which states:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.

28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); see also Surratt, 797 F.3d at 247 (“If a federal prisoner brings a § 2241 petition that does not fall within the scope of this ‘savings clause,’ then the district court must dismiss the ‘unauthorized habeas motion . . . for lack of jurisdiction,’ even if the Government supports the prisoner’s position.”) (quoting Rice, 617 F.3d at 807)).³

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that a petitioner must establish the following criteria to demonstrate that a § 2255 motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of a prisoner’s detention:

(1) at the time of conviction, settled law of this circuit or the Supreme Court established the legality of the conviction; (2) subsequent to the prisoner’s direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, the substantive law changed such that the conduct of which the prisoner was convicted is deemed not to be criminal; and (3) the prisoner cannot satisfy the gatekeeping provisions of § 2255 because the new rule is not one of constitutional law.

Surratt, 797 F.3d at 247 (quoting In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333-34 (4th Cir. 2000)).

³ Petitioner indicates that he has been unsuccessful in seeking relief under § 2255. However, “the remedy afforded by § 2255 is not rendered inadequate or ineffective merely because an individual has been unable to obtain relief under that provision, or because an individual is procedurally barred from filing a § 2255 motion.” See In re Vial, 115 F.3d at 1194 n.5 (citations omitted); see also Surratt, 797 F.3d at 252 (same).

Moreover, the Fourth Circuit has repeatedly held that the savings clause only preserves claims in which the petitioner alleges actual innocence of a conviction, Surratt, 797 F.3d at 247, and does not extend to petitioners who challenge only their sentences. See United States v. Poole, 531 F.3d 263, 267 n.7 (4th Cir. 2008); see also Rouse v. Wilson, 584 F. App'x 76 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding that the district court properly determined that a petitioner could not challenge a career offender enhancement under § 2241); Farrow v. Revell, 541 F. App'x 327 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that a petitioner's challenge to an Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA") sentence enhancement was not cognizable under § 2241 via the § 2255 savings clause). As "the Supreme Court has told us," actual innocence " 'means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.' " Surratt, 797 F.3d at 250 (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998)).

In this case, Petitioner provides no factual allegations to plausibly suggest that the conduct for which he was convicted has been deemed non-criminal by any substantive law change since his direct appeal and first § 2255 motion. Instead, Petitioner challenges the legal classification of a predicate offense used to enhance his sentence, which "constitutes the sort of argument . . . deemed insufficient" by the Fourth Circuit to trigger relief under the savings clause. Surratt, 797 F.3d at 250. It is noteworthy in light of Petitioner's arguments alleging that a North Carolina conviction has been improperly used to enhance the sentence in light of United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011), that Simmons did not decriminalize the conduct for which Petitioner was convicted. See Surratt, 797 F.3d at 246 (affirming district court's conclusion that a petitioner could not challenge his sentence and obtain relief under § 2241 where he "could not establish that Simmons rendered any of his conduct 'noncriminal' "). As Petitioner cannot satisfy the criteria to invoke § 2255's savings

clause and proceed under § 2241, the instant Petition is subject to summary dismissal. Surratt, 797 F.3d at 268.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, the court recommends that the Petition in the above-captioned case be dismissed without prejudice and without requiring the respondent to file a return.

s/ Thomas E. Rogers, III
Thomas E. Rogers, III
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

October 30, 2015
Columbia, South Carolina

The parties' attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.

Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.’” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 2317
Florence, South Carolina 29503

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).